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MOVING TOWARD A CLEARER DEFINITION OF INSIDER
TRADING: WHY ADOPTION OF THE POSSESSION
STANDARD PROTECTS INVESTORS
Lacey S. Calhoun*

In recent years, insider trading has become a publicized focus of securities law
enforcement. The definition of insider tradinghas emerged slowly through case law,
and the term has been clarified by new theories of liability. The use and possession
tests are two standards of liability used to judge the treatment of inside information.
The use standard offers a defense to insider trading liability while the possession
standard premises liability on mere possession of inside information. This Note
argues that courts should adopt the possession standard because this standardbetter
protects investors, a primary goal of the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934.

INTRODUCTION

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)' created
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to regulate the
securities markets of the United States.2 In section 4 of the Exchange Act, 3 Congress delegated to the SEC "the task of grappling
with the problem areas [of securities law]."' Insider trading, "a
term of art referring generally to any unlawful trading by persons
possessing material nonpublic information, 5 is one such problem

*

Attorney, Midwest Regional Office, United States Securities and Exchange Com-

mission. Note Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 32, 1999. B.A.
1996, Duke University; J.D. 1999, University of Michigan Law School. This Note was prepared while the author was a student. I would like to thank Professor Adam Pritchard for his
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for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed herein
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author's colleagues upon the staff of the Commission.
1.
15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994).
2.
SeeJAMESD. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 7 (2d ed. 1997).
3.
15 U.S.C. § 78d (1994).
4.
Cox ET AL., supra note 2, at 7.
5.
Id. at 775.
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area and has received increasing attention since the 1980s.6 With
the well-publicized prosecutions of such figures as Michael Milliken, Ivan Boesky, and Dennis Levine, the media has painted
insider traders as greedy swindlers of the investing public who
make millions off their use of inside information and are fined millions when convicted.7 Despite the publicity and severe penalties,
insider trading continues to pervade the securities industry and the
SEC has made it an "enforcement priority.""
During the past two decades, courts and litigants have begun to
define more precisely the activities that give rise to insider trading
liability.9 In 1997, the Supreme Court's acceptance of the misap° resolved the
propriation theory in United States v. O'Hagan"
question of who can be liable for insider trading, but lower courts
continue to debate remaining issues of liability. 2 In particular,
courts question whether or not mere possession of inside information leads to a presumption that the inside information was the
basis of a trade. 3 Two tests exist to determine insider trading liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act: 14 the

Media attention to cases involving large sums of money and Hollywood's portrayal
6.
of insider trading on Wall Street have brought the issue to the attention of the public. See,
e.g., WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 1987).
See Bryan S. Schultz, Feigning Fidelity to Section 10(b): Insider Trading Liability After
7.
United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997), 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1411, 1411 (1998)
(describing how the convictions of Wall Street employees such as Milliken, Levine, and Boesky for insider trading and their subsequent fines totaling over $1.4 billion piqued public
interest in insider trading).
8.
Harvey L. Pitt, Insider Trading: The Lower Courts' Reaction to Dirks, in BANKS, THE
SEC,

AND

REGULATORY

AGENCIES:

ENFORCEMENT AND

CIVIL LITIGATION

DEVELOPMENTS

1985, at 585, 611 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 476, 1985).
9.
See generally United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (accepting the misappropriation theory of liability); United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998)
(arguing that the use standard should be used to judge insider trading liability in a criminal
trading case); SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998) (arguing that the use standard
should be used to judge insider trading in a civil insider trading case); United States v.
Teicher, 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993) (arguing that the possession standard should be used
to judge insider trading liability). For a discussion of the misappropriation theory of insider
trading liability, see infra Part IIB; for a discussion of the use standard, see infra notes 1719 and accompanying text; for a discussion of the possession standard, see infra note 16 and
accompanying text.
10.
521 U.S. 642 (1997).
See infra Part Ill.
11.
12.
See generally Smith, 155 F.3d at 1051; Adler, 137 F.3d at 1325; Teicher, 987 F.2d at 112.
13.
See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1059; Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337; Teicher,987 F.2d at 119.
See 15 U.S.C.§ 78j(b) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996) (stating that it isunlaw14.
ful for any person to use a manipulative device, scheme, or artifice to defraud or to engage
inany fraudulent or deceitful act in connection with the purchase or sale of any security).
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"possession" test and the "use" test. 5 For years, the SEC has supported the stricter "possession" standard, arguing that insiders
automatically violate Rule 10b-5 by possessing material nonpublic
information when entering into a transaction.' 6 Defendants advocate, and courts often choose, the "use" test which requires a
showing of intent to use the material nonpublic information in the
transaction or proof that such inside information is the basis of a
trade. 7 Although a trade is a prerequisite to liability under both
standards, an insider selling stock in his corporation is liable under
the possession standard if he is shown simply to have possessed material inside information at the time of the trade. Under the use
standard, he must be shown to have used the information as the
basis of the trade.
Thus, the use standard allows -corporations, law firms, and defendants to defend against a showing of possession.' For example,
an insider could rebut a showing that he possessed material nonpublic information during a transaction with evidence of his
preplanned intent to sell the stock to finance his child's college
education, a plan independent of his possession of the information.' 9
The SEC finds that the possession standard better protects investors because it removes any ambiguity as to what behavior creates
liability and any possibility of false defenses.2 0 The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the use standard 2' while the Second
Circuit has adopted the possession standard.22 This Note argues
that the possession standard better reflects Congress' intent in creating the Exchange Act, specifically section 10(b), and better
protects the economic interests of investors and markets.
Part I of this Note identifies the statutory language and legislative history necessary to enlighten the use versus possession
distinction. Part II examines recent legislative attempts to clarify
the definition of insider trading. Part III provides an overview of
the recently-resolved debate over the classical and the misappropriation theories, which determined the issue of who can be liable
15.

For a discussion of the questions underlying each test, see Cox ET AL., supra note

2, at 782.
16.
See id.
17.
See, e.g., Smith, 155 F.3d at 1069-70; Adler, 137 F.3d at 1332, 1337.
18.
See Allan Horwich, Possession Versus Use: Is There a CausationElement in the Prohibition
oflnside Trading?,52 Bus. LAw. 1235, 1241 (1997).
19.
See id. at 1325.

20.

See id. at 1361-65.

21.
22.

See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1070; Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337.
See United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1993).
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for insider trading. The Supreme Court's reasoning in adopting
the misappropriation theory in O'Hagan offers a rationale for accepting the possession theory as well: investors need protection,
and a stricter definition of insider trading would protect investors.
Part IV identifies the current state of the use versus possession debate by examining recent circuit court decisions and the SEC's
reaction to those cases. This Note concludes by recommending
that the SEC or Congress promulgate a definition of insider trading that clearly sets forth the possession standard.
A concrete, uniform definition of insider trading is necessary. 13
Congress has authorized increased penalties for insider trading,
the SEC has devoted greater resources to criminal insider trading
prosecutions, and the government has announced an intention to
seek prison sentences more frequently. 24 In light of this increased
enforcement, the fact that the law of insider trading is open to interpretation is "unacceptable." 25 In creating the SEC and giving it
the task of dealing with "problem areas 2 6 of securities law, Congress intended the SEC to have extraordinary powers to protect
investors and the public interest.27 Courts should accept the SEC's
possession standard as consistent with Congressional intent in creating the SEC and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.

I. STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

A. Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5

In relevant part, section 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of'interstate com-

23.
SeeJill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis andProposalfor Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REv. 179, 208 (1991) (advocating uniformity in imposing insider trading

liability).
24.
See id.at 183.
25.
See id. (referring to 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 (1994); H.R. REP. No. 100-910 at 23 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6060).
26.
Cox ET AL., supra note 2, at 7.
27.
See Steve Thel, The OriginalConception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42
STAN. L. REv. 385, 460 (1990).
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merce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. s
The SEC adopted Rule lOb-5 under its section 10(b) rulemaking
authority. Rule lOb-5 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, [or]

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any per29
son, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

B. Legislative History

The Exchange Act was passed largely in response to the stock
market crash of 1929.' 0 Little legislative history exists concerning
congressional intent in enacting the Exchange Act, but the protection of investors was "indisputably one of Congress's ultimate
objectives."'" As a presidential candidate in 1932, Franklin Roosevelt
28.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
29.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
30.
See Thel, supra note 27, at 408.
31.
John H. Karnes, Jr., Lenders'LiabilityforAiding and Abetting Rule 10b-5 Violations: The
Knowledge Standard,41 Sw. L.J. 925, 934 n.58 (1987); seealso SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401
F.2d 833, 858 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating that the dominant congressional purposes underlying
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called for federal regulation of the securities markets, and after his
election efforts to draft legislation began) 2 In February of 1934,
Senator Duncan Fletcher introduced a final version of a bill called
the National Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Congressman Sam
Rayburn, Chairman of the House Commerce Committee, introduced the bill to the House. 3' All the important features of the
Exchange Act, except the establishment of the SEC, trace back to
the Fletcher-Rayburn bill.34 Under section 9(c), the original version
of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,35 the Federal Trade Commis-

sion (the predecessor to the SEC in securities regulation) was
authorized to proscribe the use of any "device or contrivance" in
36
connection with the purchase or sale of a registered security. In
fact, the language of Fletcher-Rayburn section 9(c) was quite similar to that of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.3 7 The drafters of

section 9(c) did not attempt to forbid only knowing and intentional misconduct designed to deceive investors but also "seem to
have intended to authorize the FTC to regulate even innocent
conduct that might injure the public at large." Although the proposed bill in its entirety elicited much comment and criticism from
financial institutions, corporate managers, and the president of the
New York Stock Exchange, section 9(c) itself did not draw substantial comment or harsh criticism.3 9

the Exchange Act were to promote free and open public securities markets and to protect
the investing public from suffering inequities in trading).
32.
See Thel, supra note 27, at 414-15.
33.
See id. at 425-26 (referring to S. 2693, 73d Cong. (1934), reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF

EXCHANGE

1933

AND

THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF

(J. S. Ellenberger

& Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973); H.R. 7852, 73d Cong. (1934),
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES
ACT OF 1934, item 24 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973) [collectively

1934, item 34
reprinted in 10

hereinafter FLETCHER-RAYBURN]).
34.
See id. at 426.
35.
See id. at 430.

See FLETCHER-RAYBURN, supra note 33, § 9 (c), quoted in Thel, supra note 27, at 429.
36.
Compare text accompanying note 28 (giving language of § 10(b) of the Exchange
37.
Act) with FLETCHER-RAYBURN, supra note 33, § 9(c) ("It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange... [t]o use or employ in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange any device or contrivance which, or any device or contrivance in a way or manner
which the [FC] may by its rules and regulations find detrimental to the public interest or
to the proper protection of investors.").
38. Thel, supra note 27, at 433.
39.

See id. at 440.
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In March 1934, Rayburn introduced a revision of the proposed
bill.40 As revised, section 9(c) applied not only to registered securities but also to those "not so registered" and added the word
"manipulative" to the devices or contrivances proscribed by section 9(c).

41

One change Rayburn did not add to section 9(c) may

be more indicative of the intent of section 10(b)'s predecessor
than the changes he did make.42 Rayburn added purpose or motive
requirements to section 8 of the bill4 3 but significantly added no

such requirement to section 9. In fact, no motive requirement was
ever suggested. 44 "This open-ended section was intended to authorize administrators to prohibit stock market practices, regardlessof the
motives of those who employed them, which were found detrimen45
tal to the public interest or the proper protection of investors.,
While the final version of the Senate bill4 6 gave the SEC the
power to forbid a device that was contrary to the interests of investors, the Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to make rules necessary
or appropriate to the public interest or for the protection of investors.47 There are two important purposes of the Exchange Act: to
control speculation and to give the SEC extraordinary powers to
achieve this control.48 "Because the Act's narrowly defined grants of

rulemaking power did not provide for complete and effective control, and because Congress realized that it lacked the expertise to
enact a complete program of statutory controls, section 10(b) was
designed to serve this purpose. "49
The SEC's promulgation of Rule lOb-5 was a turning point in
the interpretation of securities law because it provided a means
of prosecuting insider trading. 50 As litigation under Rule lOb-5
increases, courts and private plaintiffs have assumed the

40.
See id. at 442-43 (citing H.R. 8720, 73d Cong. (1934), reprinted in Stock Exchange
Regulation, Hearingson H. 7852 and HR 8720 Before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 625 (1934)).
41.
See id. at 443-47.
42.
See id. at 447.
43.
See FLETCHER-RAYBURN, supra note 33, § 8(a) (3) (premising liability on "the purpose of creating ... a false or misleading appearance of active trading"); FLETCHERRAYBURN, supra note 33, § 8(b) (giving a private remedy for willful violation of the statute).
44.
See Thel, supra note 27, at 447.
45.
Id. (emphasis added).
46.
The bill went through revisions in the House and the Senate, and § 9(c) became
§ 10(b). See generally Thel, supra note 27, at 449-61.
47.
See id. at 460.
48.
See id.
49.
Id.
50.
See generally id. (explaining the effects of Rule IOb-5).
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policy-making powers that Congress delegated to the SEC in 1934.51
In fact, commentators have gone so far as to state that "if the Supreme Court's conception of section 10(b) is fixed and if the SEC
is held to the limits of that conception in the future, then it seems
that the attempt to empower the SEC to regulate the stock market
as it saw fit has failed. 5 2 While it is impossible to avoid court interpretation of insider trading law, the SEC's promotion of standards
which better protect the interests of investors matches the intent of
the Exchange Act, and courts should defer to its position.
Professor Steve Thel argues that section 10(b) was meant to give
the SEC the power to regulate any practice that might contribute
to speculation in securities prices or that might move securities
prices away from investment value.53 Other commentators and
cases support his suggestion that the economic interests of investors and the general public 54are better served by regulation of the
markets and insider trading.
The intent behind the creation of the Exchange Act sheds light
on the use versus possession debate. Congress intended the SEC to
have the power to prohibit practices regardless of motive and with
an eye toward the public interest,55 and the possession standard is a
proper exercise of that power because it disregards motive and
emphasizes the public interest.
II.

RECENT LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES

Congress made numerous attempts in the 1980's to clarify and
extend the reach of insider trading laws. In 1984, Congress enacted
the Insider Trading Sanctions Act (ITSA),56 which allows the SEC
to seek treble damages for insider trading violations.57 ITSA
51.
52.
53.
54.

See id. at 463.
Id. at 464.
See id. at 385-86.
See Cox ET AL., supra note 2, at 1072 (stating that there is significant public interest

in the securities markets' fair, open, and competitive operation, and to that end, the markets are a crucial public factor in the functioning of the economy); Bateman, Eichler, Hill
Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985) (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 196-87 (1963) (holding that the primary objective of the federal securities laws, the protection of the investing public and national economy, would be promoted
through the promotion of a high standard of business ethics)).
55.
See supra notes 44-45.
56.
Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c, 78o,
78t, 78u, and 78ff (1994)).
57.
See id.
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amends the Exchange Act and authorizes the SEC to seek civil
penalties of up to three times the amount of profit gained or loss
avoided "by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of
material, nonpublic information. ' 8 Although ITSA's language appears to adopt the possession standard, the "legislation does not
change the underlying substantive case law of insider trading as
reflected in judicial and administrative holdings."59 The Eleventh
Circuit considered ITSA in SEC v. Adler6° but concluded that ITSA
did not resolve the question of whether use or possession was the
proper standard for insider trading liability under section 10(b)
and Rule 1Ob-5 .
In 1988, Congress enacted the Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act (ITSFEA).62 ITSFEA encourages principals
to take greater responsibility for the actions of their agents; requires brokers, dealers, and investment advisors to more clearly
supervise agents; increases criminal penalties; and codifies a private cause of action for people who trade contemporaneously with
insiders.6 3 ITSFEA adds section 20A(a) to the Exchange Act.64 The
new section expressly provides a private cause of action against
persons who violate the Exchange Act "by purchasing or selling a
security while in possession of material, nonpublic information., 65
This language also suggests that a showing of possession alone will
suffice under section 20A(a).
In 1987, the SEC drafted legislation that would judge insider
trading by the possession standard, prohibiting "wrongful trading
in securities while in possession of material, nonpublic information."66 The SEC's draft language made clear that no proof of use
would be required and thus eliminated "'post-hoc rationalizations'
that the trading was on the basis of something other than the
58.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (a) (1997).
H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 13, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2286 (1984); see
59.
also SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1336 (11th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that although ITSA uses
the word "possession," legislative history seems to deny any attempt to use ITSA to modify
the definition of insider trading liability).
137 F.3d at 1325.
60.
61.
See id. at 1337.
62.
10 Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified in various sections of 15
U.S.C.).
63.
See 134 CONG. Ric. 32545 (1988); MichaelJ. Chmiel, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988: Codifying a Private Right of Action, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 645,
646.
64.
15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a) (1991).
65.
Id. (emphasis added).
66.
SEC Compromise Proposalon Insider TradingLegislation;Accompanying Letter, and Analysis by Ad Hoc Legislation Committee, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1817 (Nov. 27, 1987).
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inside information."67 In 1988, Senators Donald Riegle of Michigan
and Alfonse D'Amato of New York sponsored a different bill on
insider trading. t Senate Bill 1380 would have required proof that
inside information was gained or used wrongfully: "trading while in
possession of material, non-public information concerning [a] security does not, standing alone, constitute [insider trading]. ' 9
Under a compromise between proposed Senate Bill 1380 and the
SEC's draft, the government would have had to show wrongful
trading in a security while in possession of inside information and
would have had to establish scienter as well.7 ° None of these proposed definitions of insider trading were enacted.
These initiatives demonstrate the legislature's continued concern about insider trading and the SEC's early attempt to
introduce legislation supporting the possession standard. Still, the
use versus possession controversy has been defined more by case
law than by legislative initiative. As the Circuits increasingly discuss
the meaning of insider trading and whether it is judged by a use or
possession standard, there is an increased need for a uniform definition.
III.

THE RESOLUTION OF THE CLASSICAL AND
MISAPPROPRIATION DEBATE

Two theories of who can be liable for insider trading have
emerged from judicial and administrative interpretation of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 over the past thirty years. 7' A corporate
insider is liable under the "classical" theory of insider trading when
he trades in his corporation's securities on the basis of material
nonpublic information that he has obtained through his position

67.
SEC Submits Draft Legislative History to Accompany Inside Trading Proposal, 20 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 252, 253 (Feb. 19, 1988) [hereinafter SEC Submits Draft] (quoting Proposed
Languagefor Inclusion in Committee Report on Insider Trading Definition, reprinted in SEC's Draft
Legislative Languagefor Proposed Insider Trading Bill, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 279 (Feb.
19, 1988)).
68.
See 133 CoNG. REc. 16,387 (1987); see also SEC Submits Draft, supra note 67, at 253.
69.
Brief Explanatory Memorandum to S. 1380, reprinted in 133 CONG. REc. 16,392
(1987); see also Sens. Riegle, D'Amato Propose Bill to Clarify Definition of Insider Trading, 19 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 903 June 19, 1987).
70.
See SEC Submits Draft, supranote 67, at 253.
71.
SeeJohn F. X. Peloso & Stuart M. Sarnoff, Insider Trading Turned Upside Down, N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 17, 1996, at 3.
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with the corporation.2 In contrast, section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5
liability under the "misappropriation" theory occurs when a corporate outsider trades on material confidential information in breach
of a duty owed to the source of the information, not to the person with whom he trades.73 Circuits were divided over the
appropriateness of using the misappropriation theory as an alternative to the classical theory in judging insider trading
liability, until the Supreme Court ended
the debate in O'Haganby
4
accepting the misappropriation theory.
While the classical and misappropriation theories focus on the
"who" of insider trading, the use versus possession debate outlines
the courts' attempts to define the "how" of insider trading. The
history of the classical and misappropriation theories illustrates the
Supreme Court's willingness to accept the SEC's endorsement of a
more encompassing definition of insider trading.75 Clarification of
the definition of insider trading and a broader standard of liability
better protect the investing public.

A. The Classical Theory

Corporate insiders such as officers, directors, or controlling
shareholders who violate their duty to the corporation's shareholders by trading on the basis of material nonpublic information
are liable under the classical theory of insider trading.76 In 1980, in
Chiarellav. United States,77 the Supreme Court affirmed that failure
to disclose the purchase or sale of securities could be fraud under

72.
See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1980); In re Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
73.
See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652-53 (1997).
74.
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits held that insider trading liability could be premised only on the classical theory and not upon the misappropriation theory. See United
States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996) rev'd, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); United States v.
Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995). The Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits accepted the
SEC's application of the misappropriation theory, holding that insider trading liability could
be based on either the classical or misappropriation theory. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403
(7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Newman, 664
F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
75.
See supra notes 71-74.
76.
See O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 651-52.
77.
445 U.S. 222 (1980). In Chiarella,a financial printer working on announcements of
corporate takeover bids deduced the identities of the corporations involved, although their
names were blank or false in the documents, purchased stock in the target companies, and
sold the stock when the takeover attempts were made public. See id. at 224.
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section 10(b), despite the lack of statutory language or legislative
history connecting nondisclosure and fraud under section 10(b).7 s
The classical theory relies on the assumption that the "relationship
of trust and confidence" between the insider and shareholders creates the duty to disclose. 9 The Court relied on decisions of other
courts that found section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations when a
relationship of trust and confidence existed between the parties. 0
The Second Circuit held that "[a]nyone--corporate insider or
not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may
not use that information to trade in securities without incurring an
affirmative duty to disclose."8 ' Reversing the Second Circuit, the
Supreme Court emphasized that the defendant was a "complete
stranger" to the sellers and that "the element required to make silence fraudulent-a duty to disclose-is absent in this case. ' The
Supreme Court relied heavily on the "disclose or abstain" rule,
which states that "a corporate insider must abstain from trading in
the shares of his corporation unless he
has first disclosed all mate83
him.
to
known
information
rial inside
In 1983, in Dirks v. SEC,84 the Supreme Court applied the principles of Chiarella to the case of a tippee who received material
nonpublic information from an insider of a corporation.8 5 The
Court found that the tippee could not have violated section 10(b)
78.
See id. at 230.
79.
Id.
80.
See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972)
(holding that because officers of a bank had a responsibility to shareholders, they could not
act as market makers inducing shareholders to sell without disclosing the existence of a
more favorable market); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968)
(finding a violation of § 10(b) where geologists and engineers of the corporation traded
with nonpublic material knowledge of the discovery of a potential mine that had more than
a marginal possibility of creating substantial benefits for the company); General Time Corp.
v. Talley Indus., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that no Rule lOb-5 liability existed when a purchaser of a stock was not an insider and owed no fiduciary duty to the
seller); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911-12 (1961) (finding a corporate director
liable under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because the antifraud obligation rests on the existence
of a relationship to the company and correlative duties).
81.
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222
(1980).
82.
Chiarella,445 U.S. at 232-33.
83.
Id. at 227 (emphasis added) (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907
(1961)). The Court found the printer, Chiarella, was not a corporate insider and thus not
liable under the classical theory.
84.
463 U.S. 646 (1983). The insider, a former corporate officer, told an investment
analyst, Dirks, that the corporation was overstating assets as a result of fraudulent corporate
practice. Dirks investigated the allegations and discussed this information with clients but
never traded on the information himself. See id. at 648-49.
85.
See id.
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or Rule lOb-5, because he was not an agent of the corporation, a
fiduciary, or a person in whom the securities sellers had placed
trust or confidence. 8 The Court found that a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation when the insider,
who acts as a tipper to the tippee, has breached his fiduciary duty
to the shareholders in disclosing material nonpublic information
to the tippee and when the tippee knew or should have known of
the breach.87 Here, the tipper did not breach a fiduciary duty to
the corporation's shareholders. 88 The shareholders were not
harmed by his disclosure, he did not benefit from disclosing the
information, and his only motivation was to expose fraud in his
corporation. 89 Because the tipper did not breach a fiduciary duty, it
followed that the tippee never assumed a fiduciary duty and thus
did not violate section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. 90
B. The MisappropriationTheory
"In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between
company insider and purchaser or seller of the company's stock,
the misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciaryturned-trader's deception of those who entrusted him with access
to confidential information." 9' Even though the person defrauded
is the source of the information, not the shareholders or other
party involved in the trade, the "in connection with" requirement
of section 10(b) is met because, under the misappropriation theory, "the fiduciary's fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary
gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to
his principal,
he uses the information to purchase or sell securi92
ties."

In United States v. O'Hagan a partner of a law firm was held
criminally liable under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 for the
86.
See id. at 654 (citing Chiarella,445 U.S. at 232). The Court recognized in Dirks that
liability could apply to people typically considered outsiders-underwriters, accountants,
lawyers, or consultants working for the corporation-who could be considered insiders if
they became fiduciaries of the shareholders through their work with the company. See id. at
655 n.14.
87.
See id. at 660.
88.
See id. at 666-67.
89.
See id. at 667.
90.
See id.
91.
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
92.
Id. at 656.
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misappropriation of confidential information regarding a client's
planned tender offer for another company's stock9 In its amicus
curiae brief to the Eighth Circuit, the North American Securities
Administrators Association (NASAA) urged the Supreme Court to
find O'Hagan liable under the misappropriation theory as
advanced by the SEC.94 NASAA noted that the Second, Seventh,9
and Ninth Circuits had adopted the misappropriation theory. 5
NASAA also argued that the misappropriation theory would help
protect persons who trade in the public securities markets. 96
The Supreme Court, overturning the Eighth Circuit, held that
statutory language and caselaw allow liability under the misappropriation theory. 97 The Court noted "that section 10(b) refers to
'the purchase or sale of any security,' not to identifiable purchasers
or sellers of securities. 9 8 The Court also recognized that both Chiarella and Dirks "left room for application of the misappropriation
theory."" Not only is the misappropriation theory consistent with
the statute and precedent,'00 it is consistent with an "animating"
purpose of the Exchange Act.1' Prohibiting insider trading is "well
tuned to an animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure
honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence
... [I]nvestors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a
market where trading based 0on
2 misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law.'
The ability to base insider trading liability on the misappropriation theory as well as the classical theory broadens the definition of
insider trading by enlarging the class of potentially liable parties.
By accepting the misappropriation theory and the SEC's argu-

93.
See id. at 647-49.
94.
See Brief of Amici Curiae North Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n, Inc., and Law Professors in
Support of Petitioner at 3, United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996) (No. 96842). NASAA is a forum where state security regulators work together and with federal and
international securities regulators "to protect investors and promote fair, open and honest
capital markets." Id. at 1.
95.
See id. at 3.
96.
See id. at 8-9.
97.
See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653-65 (examining the propriety of, and ultimately adopting, the misappropriation theory).
98.
Id. at 660 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)).
99.
Id. at 662-63. The cases did not hold that liability could be premised only on relationships between corporate insiders and shareholders or that a person escapes § 10(b)
liability when trading on information gained through misappropriation. See id.
100. See id. at 665.
101. See id. at 658 (stating in part that "[tirading on misappropriated information
.undermines the integrity of, and investor confidence in, the securities markets'").
102. Id. at 658 (citation omitted).
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ments in O'Hagan, the Supreme Court defined insider trading in a
manner that allows increased liability for reprehensible activity."'
Further clarification of the definition of insider trading through
the possession test would continue the steps taken by the Supreme
Court in O'Hagan to allow the SEC to protect investors as Congress
intended.
IV.

THE USE VERSUS POSSESSION DEBATE IN THE CIRCUITS

The distinction between the use and possession standards rests
on whether the government must show that the insider actually
used the material nonpublic information when trading. In practice, the SEC consistently argues for the broader possession
standard, 10 4 while defendants in insider trading cases find the more
limited use standard appealing.1 0 5 Neither standard is so strongly
established as to provide a prescribed course of action. Although
both standards arguably require use before there is an actionable
claim, the focus of the standards is not on "use" in the sense that a
transaction must occur to prove liability. The focus is on what intent the SEC or a private plaintiff has to show in order to prove
insider trading liability.
The Second Circuit adopted the possession standard in United
States v. Teicher.l1 6 Though the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits adopted
I
the use standard in SEC v. Adler
'

7

and United States v. Smith,' °s their

discussions of Teicher reveal that the choice between the use and
possession standards is still open to interpretation. Because there is
a split in the Circuits over the use versus possession debate, the issue is ripe for a Supreme Court decision.

103. See id. at 653-65.
104. See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1066 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1332-39 (lth Cir. 1998); United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120
(2d Cir. 1993).
105. See Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337; Teicher, 987 F.2d at 119-20.
106. 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993).
107. 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998).
108. 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998).
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A. United States v. Teicher
In 1993, the Second Circuit in Teicher utilized the possession
standard in its discussion of insider trading liability.' °9 During the
mid-1980's, an associate at a law firm provided certain
arbitrageurs 10 with information concerning possible acquisitions by
the firm's clients, and the arbitrageurs used this information to
make trades."' The district court found the arbitrageurs, Teicher
and Frankel, guilty of securities fraud." 2 On appeal, Teicher and
Frankel did not challenge the district court's definition in its jury
instructions that to misappropriate is "to wrongfully take and use
the information in violation of a fiduciary duty to hold the
information in confidence," 3 but they did contest the propriety of
the district court's definition of the word "use" in its definition of
misappropriation.1 4 Teicher and Frankel argued that material
nonpublic information is "used" only when the SEC can prove that
the trading was causally connected to the misappropriated
information and that the trading was not done properly without a
connection to the misappropriation. 5 The Second Circuit upheld
the district court's instruction that the government need not prove
a causal relationship between the misappropriated material
nonpublic information and the defendants' trading. 116 In this case,
the court upheld jury instructions that the government did not
need to prove that the defendants purchased or sold securities
using the material nonpublic information that they knowingly
possessed; it was sufficient for the government to prove that "the
defendants purchased or sold securities while
knowingly in possession
7

of the material nonpublic information.""

The Second Circuit favorably discussed the government's position that a person violates section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when he
trades in possession of "material nonpublic information obtained
109. See Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120.
110. See id. at 114-18. Arbitrageurs are people who trade in securities in companies that
are the subject of changes in corporate control in order to take advantage of fluctuations in
securities prices. See id.
at 114.
111. Seeid. at 114-18.
112. Seeid.at 114.
113. Id.at 119.
114. Teicher and Frankel contended that the court defined "use" as the equivalent of
mere possession and challenged this as overly broad. See id.
115. See id.
at 119.
116. See id. at 119-21.
117. Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
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in breach of a fiduciary or similar duty." 8 The court noted that
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 require only that the deceptive practice be "in connection with -a purchase or sale of a security"'1 9 and
that the court had earlier found, in United States v. Newman,21 °0 "that
the 'in connection with' clause must be 'construed . .. flexibly to
include deceptive practices "touching" the sale of securities, a rela, 021
tionship which has been described as "very tenuous indeed."
The Court next stated that the possession test comported with the
or abstain" ideals that the Supreme Court adopted in Chi"disclose
1 22
arella.
The Second Circuit found the possession test preferable for its
simplicity because it did not require determining the motivations
of those in possession of inside information. "Unlike a loaded
weapon which may stand ready but unused, material information
cannot lay idle in the human brain., 123 The court noted that requiring a causal connection could frustrate attempts to distinguish
between legitimate trades and improper inside trades. 21 4 Although
the Second Circuit did not unequivocally adopt the possession
standard, it nonetheless came out in strong support of the SEC's

position. 125
B. SEC v. Adler

The Eleventh Circuit adopted the use test in SEC v. Adler. 26 The
case concerned use of inside information by Adler, the outside director of a corporation, and alleged tips he gave to his friend and
business partner, Pegram.1 27 The SEC argued that Pegram violated
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 when he traded in the corporation's
stock while in possession of inside information, whether or not he
118. Id. at 120 (citations omitted).
119. Id.
120. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
121. Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120 (quoting United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir.
1981)).
122. See id. For a discussion of the decision in United States v. ChiareUa, see supra notes
74-80 and accompanying text.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 121 (citing 7 Louis Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3505
(3d ed. 1991) ("The very difficulty of establishing actual use of inside information points to
possession as the test.")).
125. Seeid. at 119-21.
126. 137F.3d 1325, 1337 (llth Cir. 1998).
127. See id. at 1329-30.
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used the information. 2 8 In its brief, the SEC stated that in the insider trading context:
[T]he scienter requirement is satisfied where, as here, the
defendant knew that the information in his possession was
non-public and material. Once it is established that the
defendant acted with scienter, there is no additional
requirement that the information be used. A corporate
insider like Pegram who trades in his company's stock has a
duty to disclose the inside information in his possession or
abstain from trading.)
The SEC noted that when a corporate insider has information
about his company that he knows, or is reckless in not knowing, is
material nonpublic information, he acts with deception by trading
without disclosing the information because he knows that the person on the other side of the trade is acting without the benefit of
the information. 30 The scienter requirement is met because a person is deemed to have intended the consequences of his actions
when he knows what the consequences will be.13 ' The SEC cited the
32
"disclose or abstain" rule of Chiarella in support of its position.
Because Pegram was a corporate insider trading in the stock of his
own company, the SEC reasoned that he had a duty to disclose the
material nonpublic information or abstain from trading. According
to the 33SEC, use of inside information was not a necessary element.1

The Eleventh Circuit rejected the SEC's reasoning. The court
stated that the combination of Supreme Court dicta and lower
court precedent, suggesting no violation of section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 in the absence of a causal connection, required the adoption
of the use test. 3 5 The court noted that immediately after describing
128. See Corrected Brief of the SEC, Appellant, at 14, SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (11 th
Cir. 1998) (No. 96-6084) [hereinafter Adler Brief].
129. Id. at 14-15.
130. See id. at 18-19.
131. See id. at 18 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) ("If the actor
knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and
still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.")).
132. See id. at 20; see also supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis used by the Supreme Court in United States v. Chiarella,445 U.S. 222 (1980)).
133. See Adler Brief, supra note 128, at 22.
134. SeeSEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (1lth Cir. 1998).
135. See id. at 1333-37 (stating in part that "[e]ven if the evidence was sufficient to
permit an inference that one or more of the defendants had access to inside information,
the defendants' actual trading would conclusively rebut an inference of scienter") (citing In
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the disclose or abstain rule, the Chiarella court found "that an
insider's duty arises from 'the unfairness of allowing a corporate
insider to take advantage of [inside] information by trading
without disclosure.'

, 31 6

Even more damaging to the SEC's reliance

on Chiarellawas the Eleventh Circuit's reference to SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.:137 "'[t]he federal courts have found violations of
section 10(b) where corporate insiders used undisclosed information for their own benefit.' '1" The Eleventh Circuit also39
interpreted the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Dirks1
14
and United States v. O'Hagan140 to provide support for its holding.

1

The Dirks court stated that, "[n] ot only are insiders forbidden by
their fiduciary relationship from personally using undisclosed
corporate information to their advantage, but they also may not
give such information to an outsider for the same improper42
purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain."
This language in Dirks, and its holding that an inside tipper must
gain some personal advantage in order for an outside tippee to be
liable for trading on material nonpublic information, led the
Eleventh Circuit to infer that possession of inside information at
the time of the trade may not be enough to establish insider
trading liability. 43 The court also considered language in O'Hagan
which emphasized use: "section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are violated
when a corporate insider trades in the securities of his corporation
on the basis of material, nonpublic information. Trading on such
information qualifies as a 'deceptive device' under section 10(b)." 4 4
The language drawn from Chiarella, Dirks, and O'Hagan was
dicta. 4 5 In all three cases there was a trade based on the material
nonpublic information. The decisions seem to indicate, at the
least, confusion between the possession and use standards. The
Eleventh Circuit in Adler rebutted the SEC's argument by
re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation, 35 F.3d 1407, 1427-28 (9th Cir. 1994); DuraBilt
Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 89 F.R.D. 87, 94-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (indicating that when
defendants argued that individual facts predominated in a class certification, the relevant
issue was whether defendants relied on inside information in making trading decisions)).
136. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Chiarella,445 U.S. at 226-28) (emphasis omitted).
137. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
138. Adler, 137 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 229-30, citing SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)).
139. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
140. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
141. See Adler, 137 F.3d at 1333-34.
142. Id. (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659-60) (alterations in original).
143. See id. at 1334.
144. Id. at 1334 (quoting O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 651-52) (alterations in original).
145. See id.
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referencing the dicta in these cases, yet strangely discredited the
Second Circuit's support for the possession
standard in Teicher by
46
pointing out that it was clearly dicta.

Despite its holding, Adler was not as definitive a statement
against the SEC's position as it first appeared. The Eleventh Circuit
found the decision between the use and possession tests
"difficult."047 More important for the SEC's future arguments was
the court's admission that it declined to "accord much deference
to the SEC position for three reasons.' 48 First, the SEC did not
contend that the Adler court should defer to its position; second,
the SEC's position on use has not always been consistent; and
third, the SEC had ample opportunity to adopt a rule or amend
Rule lOb-5 in support of the possession standard. 49 This language
suggests that if the SEC makes its support of the possession standard absolute, courts will more likely defer.
The SEC did not react strongly to Adler. Commenting that the
SEC approved more of Teicher than of Adler, SEC Enforcement Director Richard Walker noted that even under Adler, the burden was
on the defendant to rebut the inference that use arises from possession. 5 Although Walker acknowledged that the SEC must
recognize the law of the Eleventh Circuit under Adler, "that is not
what [the SEC] believe[s] is the law of the land at the present
time."' 5' At the time, Walker did not expect "a stampede towards a
rule proposal or rule change based solely and exclusively on
Adler,"' 5 believing the SEC would
wait to see what the outcome
53
would be in United States v. Smith.

C. United States v. Smith
United States v. Smith is the most recent decision in the use versus
possession debate. The Ninth Circuit held that insider trading liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 requires proof of actual

146. See id. at 1335.
147. Id. at 1337.
148. Id.at 1339.
149. See id.
150. See Internet, Munis, Microcap FraudHead List of New ChiefRichard Walker, 30 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 943-44 (June 19, 1998).
151. Id. at944.
152. Id. at 943.
153. 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998).
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use of the inside information. Smith, a vice-president of sales at a
software design firm, learned that the firm's earnings were going to
fall short of expectations and thereafter liquidated all of his stock
in the firm before the information was disclosed to the public."'
The district court found Smith guilty of insider trading.1 5 6 On appeal, Smith contended that the district court erroneously
instructed the jury that he could be convicted based 57merely upon
his possession of the material nonpublic information.1
In an amicus curiaebrief, the SEC argued that:
When a corporate insider like Smith has information relating
to his company that he knows (or is reckless in not knowing)
to be material and nonpublic and he trades in the company's
stock, he violates the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, whether or not the information is a factor in his
decision to trade. He need not be shown to have used the information. 5"
The SEC further argued that Smith's fiduciary duty to shareholders "require [d] him not to disadvantage them by failing to
disclose the material information he possesses."' 59 The SEC brief
cited Teicher in support of the possession standard.' 6 Although
Smith contended that the proper jury instruction would have been
that in order to show scienter the government had to prove that
Smith sold his shares because of the material nonpublic information
he possessed, the SEC disagreed. 6 ' The SEC defined the scienter
requirement in insider trading cases to "mean[] only that the corporate insider must know, or be reckless in not knowing, that the
information in his possession is material and nonpublic, and therefore not known to the shareholders with whom he trades.' 62
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the Second Circuit's reading of section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 in Teicher in favor of its own reading that
emphasized the manipulation, deception, and fraud required by
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
155 F.3d
159.
160.
161.
(9th Cir.
162.

See id. at 1069.
See id. at 1053.
See id. at 1054.
See id. at 1055.
Brief of the Securities Exch. Comm'n, Amicus Curiae,at 5-6, United States v. Smith,
1051 (9th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-50137).
Id. at 6.
See id. at 7-8.
See id. at 9 (citing Appellant's Brief at 50-51, United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051
1998) (No. 98-50137)).
Id.
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the statute.1 1 3 The court found the dicta in O'Hagan and Adler more
persuasive than the SEC's arguments and the dicta in Teicher16 4 The
court looked to the language of the statute, finding that the Teicher
court focused too narrowly on the "in connection with" requirement
while the Adler court more correctly emphasized the "manipulation,"
"deception," and "fraud" elements of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.16-5 The court dismissed the Second Circuit's reading of Chiarella, stating that Teichers reliance on the case was misplaced
because the inside trader in Chiarella had used the information to
consummate the trade. 166
The Ninth Circuit then dismissed the Second Circuit's policy
endorsement of the possession standard. 67 Although it found the
simplicity of the possession standard compelling, the Ninth Circuit
was confident that the government would have little trouble demonstrating use. 16 s The court expressed concern that "the SEC's
'knowing possession' standard would not be-indeed, could not
be-strictly limited to those situations actually involving intentional
fraud.' ' 69 The court was worried about cases where an investor with
a preexisting plan to trade carried out the plan after acquiring
knowledge of the material nonpublic information but with no intent to defraud or deceive."0 In attempting to protect these honest
investors, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the SEC's premise that a
corporate insider trading in possession of material nonpublic information disadvantages those to whom he owes a duty, noting that
if the insider does not "use" the material non-public information,
then both parties will make trade decisions on the basis of incomplete information. '7 ' The court asserted that the SEC's position
rested on a faulty premise that persons who trade with someone
who possesses inside information are at a disadvantage to the insider whether or not the insider uses the information during the
trade. 72 The court believed, contrary to the SEC's premise, that
"[t] he persons with whom a hypothetical insider trades are not at a
163. See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1068. Because insider trading is prohibited without being defined in the statute or rule, such a reading of the language is strictly a matter of
interpretation.
164. See id. at 1067-68.
165. See id. at 1066-68.
166. See id. at 1068-69.
167. See id. at 1069.
168. See id.
169. Id. at 1068.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
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'disadvantage' at all provided the insider does not 'use' the information to which he is privy. '' 11 The Ninth Circuit thus came to a
much stronger conclusion against the possession standard than did
the Eleventh Circuit in Adler.
The Ninth Circuit noted that the Eleventh Circuit, while adopting a use standard, stated that "when an insider trades while in
possession of material nonpublic information, a strong inference74
arises that such information was used by the insider in trading.'
Because Smith was a criminal case, the court could not establish an
of use, so it
evidentiary presumption that gave rise to an inference
75
endorsed a second variation of the use standard.
The Ninth Circuit's rejection of the possession standard is not
irrefutable and illustrates the possibility that each case on the subject will produce a unique interpretation of the definition of
insider trading. In response to Smith, SEC Enforcement Director
Richard Walker stated that the Commission was "waiting to see
what the government is going to do with respect to possible reargument or reconsideration. " 1 76 While acknowledging that Smith was
very clear, Walker emphasized that both the Smith and Teicher discussions of the use and possession standards were in the form of
dicta. 77 Despite the Ninth Circuit's adoption of the more stringent
"use" standard, Smith's conviction was affirmed, 78 and Walker predicted that the SEC "will continue to prevail because courts and
79
juries will view [such defenses] in most instances as pretextual.',
D. Why the Teicher Decision Should Be Followed
In sum, the Second Circuit favored the possession standard
urged by the SEC while the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits adopted
the use standard. 8 ° In all three cases the courts believed that

173. Id.
174. Id. at 1069 (quoting SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (1lth Cir. 1998)).
175. See id.
176. CA 9 Adopts "Use" Test for Rule lOb-5 Insider Liability, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 35, at 1227 (Aug. 28, 1998) [hereinafter CA 9 Adopts "Use" Test].
177. See id.
178. See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1070.
179. CA 9Adopts "Use" Test, supra note 176, at 1277.
180. See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1069; SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993).
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material nonpublic information was used in the transactions. 81 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's opinion in O'Hagan held that trading
"on the basis of" inside information violates Rule 10b-5.1s2 While
this language may indicate Supreme Court support of the use
standard, William R. McLucas, former Director of the SEC's Enforcement Division, "downplayed the significance of that language
...saying that the need to prove use was
not at issue-and thus
83
not resolved-by the court in O'Hagan.'
The SEC continues to advance the possession standard but has
been slow to take strong affirmative action to promote it, perhaps
because most cases have established use and punished the inside
traders. While the SEC uses Teicher to argue for possession, a comparison of the language of Adler and Smith suggests that opposition
to the possession standard in the courts is becoming stronger.184
Commentators have noted that a recent Second Circuit case, SEC
v. Warde, downplayed the importance of Teicher.8 6 In Warde, the
Second Circuit upheld a defendant's conviction because he received inside information and traded on the basis of that
information. 7 Although the Court recited the possession standard
of liability, it did not mention Teicher or the distinction between the
use and possession standards.8 8 The Second Circuit supported a
jury finding that the defendant traded with the inside information
and that the SEC presented sufficient evidence to show that the
defendant relied on the inside information in trading. 89 This
"seems to be consistent with the use standard adopted by the Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits." 190
Despite Warde, the Second Circuit's clearly enunciated reasons
for choosing the possession standard in Teicher remain valid.191 Just
181. See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1070 (upholding Smith's conviction); Adler, 137 F.3d at 1341
(noting that a reasonable jury could find that Adler had engaged in illegal insider trading);
Teicher, 987 F.2d at 121 (upholding the defendants' convictions).
182. See Geanne Rosenberg, O'HaganMay Impede Other SEC Cases: Must the SEC Now Prove
Use of Inside Information?, 20 NAT'L L.J., Nov. 10, 1997, at BI.
183. Id.
184. See Adler, 137 F.3d at 1339; Smith, 155 F.3d at 1068-69.
185.. 151 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1998).
186. See Irwin H. Warren & Beth J. Jacobwitz, Courts Weigh CausationRequirement in SEC's
Insider Trading Cases, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 21, 1998, at I (explaining that in Warde, the court purported to use a knowing possession standard; however, its analysis seemed consistent with
the use standard adopted in Adler and Smith).
187. See Warde, 151 F.3d at 48.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. Warren &Jacobwitz, supra note 186, at 8.
191. See United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1993).
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as the Supreme Court in O'Hagan recognized that the misappropriation theory comported with section 10(b), Rule lOb-5, and the
earlier insider trading decisions,'92 the Second Circuit in Teicher
noted that the possession standard comported with the language of
the statute and earlier decisions defining insider trading. 93 The
Second Circuit found that section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 require
only that a deceptive practice be conducted "in connection with a
purchase or sale of a security" and that the possession standard
comports with Chiarella's"disclose or abstain" rule. 94
Another factor used by the Second Circuit in support of the possession standard remains strong. The Court noted that the standard
was preferable for its simplicity. 95 An insider in possession of material nonpublic information has an informational advantage over
other traders. 96 The public perceives this unfair informational advantage as harming other traders and the trading markets.'9 The
Second Circuit correctly noted that the advantage in the form of
information exists in the mind of the trader. The information can-98
not act as a "loaded weapon" that can remain ready but unused.1
Whether the trader trades on the information, alters a plan to
trade, continues with a previous plan to trade, or does nothing, he
does so with an informational advantage over others in the market. 19 When the person in possession of inside information does
not trade, he is not prosecuted because he is not involved in any
illegal activity under the "disclose or abstain" rule.9 While the use
standard requires delving into the motivations and state of mind of
the trader, the simplicity of the possession standard furthers the
purpose of securities laws to protect the interests of investors and
the public. The possession standard ensures that no one-sided informational advantage exists. The investing public will not be
disadvantaged unknowingly by others' possession of inside information because people with such information will not trade. The
integrity of the markets, and therefore the economy, will be better
protected by a standard that prohibits such an informational advantage.
192. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665 (1997).
193. See Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120.
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See Fisch, supranote 23, at 226.
198. Teicher,987 F.2d at 120.
199. See id. at 120-21.
200. See United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 226-27 (1980) (discussing In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961)).
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An endorsement of the possession standard would be preferable
for its simplicity. Not only would such a standard simplify what the
government or a private plaintiff has to prove by not requiring a
factual inquiry into a trader's state of mind, 1° such a standard also
would simplify regulation of conduct and litigation by removing
any question of whether certain conduct is allowed or whether certain inferences can be established.

CONCLUSION AND A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM

The current state of the law, in which courts acknowledge both
the use and possession standards and in which no single interpretation of insider trading exists, provides no clear standard upon
which the courts, the SEC, plaintiffs, defendants, or attorneys can
rely. 20 2 Although the weight of case authority favors the use stan-

dard and is not without merit, a close reading of the cases reveals
that the distinction between the use and possession standards turns
on minute interpretations, and the intent behind the standards is
not so dissimilar. Because the objectives are not far apart, courts
should defer to the SEC's position supporting the possession standard.
The SEC's power under the Exchange Act diminishes as the
courts determine insider trading policy through frequent litigation. °3 Giving such weight to courts' decisions at the expense of
the SEC is contrary to the intention of the drafters of section 10(b)
and Rule IOb-5 of the Exchange Act. °4 The drafters of the
Exchange Act intended to give the SEC 205
the power to make rules to
protect investors and the public interest.
The possession standard simplifies what is required to prove insider trading liability and in doing so makes untenable any false
201. See Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120-21.
202. See generally Fisch, supra note 23. On December 20, 1999, after this Note was written, the SEC proposed a rule addressing the use versus possession debate. See Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading, Release Nos. 33-7787, 34-42259, IC-24209, 64 Fed. Reg.
72,590 (1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243 and 249) (proposed Dec. 20,
1999). In that release the SEC proposed Rule 10b5-1 under which insider trading liability
would arise when a person traded while "aware of" material, nonpublic information. The
proposal also provides four exceptions to liability when a trade results from a pre-existing
plan, a contract, or instruction that was made in good faith. See id.
203. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
204. See supra Part I.B.
205. See Cox ET AL., supra note 2, at 7 (noting that the Exchange Act created the SEC to
grapple with the problem areas.); Thel, supra note 27, at 461.
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defenses of prior motive for use. In clearly setting forth what behavior courts will consider actionable, the possession standard
provides a course of action for potential traders concerned about
what to do with insider knowledge. This clarification protects the
economic interests of the public and investors by providing a clear
course of action while simplifying prosecution of obvious inside
traders.
Promulgating a definition of insider trading based on either the
use or possession standard would eliminate the question of what
the SEC must prove in a case of insider trading liability. A definition based on the possession standard would be advantageous in
that the standard does not require factual inquiry into state of
mind, gives insiders a clear course of action (disclose or abstain),
and can be applied in the same manner in criminal and civil cases.
In light of increased enforcement of insider trading °6 and increased section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 litigation 2 0 ' a uniform
definition of insider trading is necessary. The resolution of the debate over acceptance of the misappropriation theory indicates that
courts should accept the SEC's theory. When coupled with the intended power of the SEC to regulate rules to protect the public
interest and investors, the possession standard becomes a clear basis for a much-needed definition of insider trading.

206.
207.

SeeFisch, supra note 23, at 180.
See Thel, supra note 27, at 463.

